UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-15-2008

State v. Cobler Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 36139

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Cobler Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 36139" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2323.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2323

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)
)

NO. 34308

v.

1

BRIAN C. COBLER,
Defendant-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF

)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

O U ~- IG O U ~
01 Appeals..Enleied on ATS by:

--

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MCLAUGHLIN
District Judge
MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of ldaho
I.S.B. # 4843
SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. # 5867

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

SARAH E. TOMPKINS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. # 7901
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ldaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..................
.
.............................................................iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE............................................................................

I

Nature of the Case .....................................................................................
'I
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ...............................................................................
2
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ..................................................................

3

ARGUMENT..........................................................................................................
4
I. Mr. Cobler's Constitutional And Statutory Issues With
Regard To The No Contact Order Entered Against Him
Are Preserved For Appeal Because They Are Implicit
In The Claims Raised In His Motion To Modify The No
Contact Order, They Are Likely To Recur On
Remand, They Are Fundamental Errors That Involve
Mr. Cobler's Basic Rights, The State Has Failed To
Provide A Record Upon Which To Conclude That
Mr. Cobler Lacks Standing To Raise These Issues,
And Because The District Court Has Reached Some
Of These Issues Of Its Own Initiative ........................................

A. Introduction ...........................................................................................4
B. Mr. Cobler's Constitutional Claims Regarding
Violation Of His Fundamental Rights As A
Parent Were Clearly Asserted In His Motion To
Modify The No Contact Order, And Most Of His
Remaining Constitutional And Statutory Claims Are
Implicit In The lssues He Raised Before The District
.............................................................................................
Court

4

1. Mr. Cobler's Assertion Of His Fundamental
Constitutional Rights As A Parent Is Clearly
Preserved In His Motion To Modify The
No-Contact Order, Mr. Cobler Has Previously
Established His Standing To Raise This Issue
As A Parent, And The State Has Made No
Record Establishing That Mr. Cobler Lacks
Standing As A Parent To Raise This Issue...................................... 5

2. Under A Liberal Reading Of Mr. Cobler's Motion To
Modify The No Contact Order, He Has Raised Facts
Sufficient To Put The District Court On Notice Of The
Substance Of Many Of His Other Assertions Of Error
On Appeal ........................................................................
C. Assuming, Arguendo, That Some Of Mr. Cobler's
Constitutional And Statutory Challenges Are Raised
For The First Time On Appeal, They Are Likely To
Recur Upon Remand And Therefore This Court May
1I
Properly Consider Them .....................................................................
D. Mr. Cobler's Statutory And Constitutional Issues Are
Justiciable By This Court Because They Are Assertions
Of Fundamental Errors That Affect Mr. Cobler's Most
Basic And Fundamental Rights ...........................................................
12
E. The District Court In This Case Reached The lssue Of
A Lack Of A Discernible Date Of Termination Of Its
Own Initiative When It Relied On This Lack Of An
Expiration Date In Denying Mr. Cobler's Motion To
Modify The No Contact Order; And Therefore This
Court May Properly Review This Issue .............................
11. The State's Failure To Assert Any Compelling State
Interest, Or Assert Any Basis Upon Which To Conclude
That I.C. 3 18-920 Is Narrowly Tailored To That
Unidentified Interest, Is Fatal To An Attempt On The Part
Of The State To Meet Its Burden Under Strict Scrutiny
Review, Which Is The Applicable Standard Of Review
For Mr. Cobler's Assertions Of Vagueness And Overbreadth
In This Case ............................................................................................ 16

A. Introduction......................................................................................... 16
B. Strict Scrutiny Is The Appropriate Standard For Review
In This Case; And The State's Failure To Assert Any
Compelling State Interest, Or Assert Any Basis Upon
Which To Conclude That I.C. 3 18-920 Is Narrowly
Tailored To That Unidentified Interest, Is Fatal To An
Attempt On The Part Of The State To Meet Its
Burden Under This Standard Of Review ...................................
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................22
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING...............................................................................
23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

18
Alexander v. U.S., 509 U.S. 544 (1993)..............................................................
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).......................................... 19
Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council. 136 Idaho 63. 28 P.3d 1006 (2001).............20
Corning v. Board of Elections of Albany Counfy, 440 N.E.2d 1326 (NY 1982) ...20
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada. 501 U.S. 1030 (1 991)........................................
13
Goff v. State. 91 Idaho 36. 37. 415 P.2d 679 (1966).............................................
8
Hauschulz v. State. 143 Idaho 462. 147 P.3d 94 (Ct . App . 2006) ........................ 8

13
Holloway v. Palmer. 105 Idaho 220. 668 P.2d 96 (1983) ....................................
Johnson v. Sunshine Mine Co.. Inc.. 106 Idaho 866, 684 P.2d 268 (1984) ........13
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).......................... 19
Marriage of Suggs. 93 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2004) ................................................ 8
Messmer v. Ker, 96 Idaho 75. 524 P.2d 536 (1974)............................................1I
Mintun v. State. 144 Idaho 656, 661. 168 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. App . 2007) ...............13
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)...........................................................13
NAACP v. Button. 371 U.S. 415 (1963) .............................................................. 19
New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971) ........................................... 19
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ............................................... 13
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) ................................................... I0
Rudeen v. Cenarrusa. 136 Idaho 560. 38 P.3d 598 (2001).................................20
Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321. 815 P.2d 1061 (1991)................................... I1
Simpson v. Cenarrusa, 130 Idaho 609. 944 P.2d 1372 (1997) ...........................20

Smith v. Idaho Com'n on Redisfricfing. 136 Idaho 542. 38 P.3d 121 (2001).......21
Sfafe v. Bingham. 116 Idaho 415. 776 P.2d 424 (1 989) .....................................12

.....
State v. Christiansen. 144 Idaho 463. 163 P.3d 1175 (2007).....................

13

State v. Doe. 144 Idaho 534. 164 P.3d 814 (2007)..........................................

14

State v. DuValt. 131 Idaho 550. 961 P.2d 641 (1998)........................................15
State v. Flint. 114 Idaho 806. 761 P.2d 1158 (1988).............................................
6
State v. Hague. 547 N .W.2d 173. 176 (S.D. 1996) ............................................18
Stafe v. Kenner. 121 Idaho 594. 826 P.2d 1306 (1992)..................................... 12
Sfate v. Korsen. 138 Idaho 706. 69 P.3d 126 (2003) ..........................................
17
State v. McCabe. 101 Idaho 727. 620 P.2d 300 (1980) ........................................9
8
Sfafe v. Sima. 98 Idaho 643. 570 P.2d 1333 (1 977) .............................................
State v. Timmons. 145 Idaho 279. 178 P.3d 644 (Ct. App . 2007) .......................13
Sfafe v. Yakovic. 145 Idaho 437. 180 P.3d 476 (2008).......................................13
Sfafe v. Young. 144 Idaho 646. 649. n.1. 167 P.3d 783 (Ct. App . 2006) ..............5
State v. Zichko. 129 Idaho 259. 923 P.2d 966 (1996)...........................................7
Troxel v. Granville. 530 U.S. 57 (2000) ...............................................................13
United States v. Salerno. 481 U.S. 739 (1987) ................................................... 17
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside. 455 U .S . 489 (1982)............................... 17
Virginia DepY of Sfafe Police v. Washington Post. 386 F.3d 567 (4thCir. 2004) .20
Weaver v. Searle Bros.. 129 Idaho 497. 927 P.2d 887 (1996)............................. 5
West Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette. 31 9 U.S. 624 (1943) ....................13

Statutes
I .C. Fj 18-920 ........................................................................................................
.5

Other Authorities

BLACK'S
LAWDICTIONARY
209 (8thEd. 2004) ........................................................20

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brian Cobler pleaded guilty to sexual battery of a minor child, sixteen or
seventeen years of age and received a unified sentence of ten years, with two years
fixed. Mr. Cobler appealed, asserting that the district court imposed an excessive
sentence, and thereby abused its discretion, and that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion for a
reduction of sentence.

Mr. Cobler also asserted that the district court abused its

discretion when it entered the criminal no contact order against him and when the court
denied his motion to modify the no contact order entered against him. This claim was
based on Mr. Cobler's assertion that the no contact order entered against him was
vague, overbroad, unduly restrictive of his parental rights, and outside the scope of the
authority granted pursuant to I.C.

5

18-920 and I.C.R. 46.2.

As a component of

Mr. Cobler's First Amendment vagueness challenges, he asked that this Court revisit
the appropriate standard for a claim that a criminal statute is void for vagueness on its
face.
The State responded by asserting that most of Mr. Cobler's constitutional and
statutory challenges were being raised for the first time on appeal and that this Court
should therefore decline to entertain the merits of those challenges. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.4-6.) The State further asserted, without augmenting any documentation in
support of this claim into the record, that Mr. Cobler's parental rights had been
terminated, and therefore he lacked standing to support his claims of a violation of his
fundamental rights as a parent. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) Finally, in a footnote, the

State asserted that the district court's failure to specify a definite date of termination was
consistent with I.C.R. 46.2. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-5, n.1.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to clarify that Mr. Cobler's constitutional and
statutory claims with regard to the no contact order entered against him are preserved
for appeal and properly justiciable by this Court. The State's bare allegation that
Mr. Cobler's parental rights have been terminated is not supported by any evidence in
the record, and therefore cannot be considered by this Court. Moreover, the State
failed to assert any state interest that would be served by the statute at issue, much less
a compelling state interest; and likewise failed to assert any basis to find that I.C.

18-

920 was narrowly tailored to that unidentified state interest. Because Mr. Cobler has
established a prima facie case that I.C. § 18-920 is unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad, both on its face and as applied, strict scrutiny review shifts the burden of
proof, which includes the burden of production, affirmatively to the State as to these
showings. The complete absence of any attempt to make either of these showings
means that the State has not met its burden of proof under strict scrutiny, and therefore
the presumption of unconstitutionality must prevail.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Cobler's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUES
I.

Are Mr. Cobler's constitutional and statutory issues with regard to the no contact
order entered against him preserved for appeal because they are implicit in the
claims raised in his motion to modify the no contact order, they are likely to recur
on remand, they are fundamental errors that involve Mr. Cobler's basic rights, the
State has failed to provide a record upon which to conclude that Mr. Cobler lacks
standing to raise these issues, and because the district court has reached some
of these issues of its own initiative?

2.

Is the State's failure to assert any compelling state interest, or assert any basis
upon which to conclude that I.C. § 18-920 is narrowly tailored to that unidentified
interest, fatal to an attempt on the part of the State to meet its burden under strict
scrutiny review, which is the applicable standard of review for Mr. Cobler's
assertions of vagueness and overbreadth in this case?

ARGUMENT

Mr. Cobler's ConstitutionalAnd Statutow lssues With Reaard To The No Contact Order
Entered Aaainst Him Are Preserved For Appeal Because Thev Are Implicit In The
Claims Raised In His Motion To Modifv The No Contact Order. They Are Likelv To
Recur On Remand, Thev Are Fundamental Errors That Involve Mr. Cobler's Basic
Rights, The State Has Failed To Provide A Record Upon Which To Conclude That
Mr. Cobler Lacks Standing To Raise These Issues, And Because The District Court Has
Reached Some Of These lssues Of Its Own Initiative
A.

Introduction
In its Respondent's Brief, the State relies entirely on assertions that the issues

raised by Mr. Cobler are not preserved for appeal, and fails to address in any way the
substance of those issues. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-6.) Mr. Cobler asserts that all of
I

his issues are preserved for appeal, and are therefore properly justiciable by this Court.
B.

Mr. Cobler's Constitutional Claims Reqardina Violation Of His Fundamental
Riahts As A Parent Were Clearly Asserted In His Motion To Modifv The No
Contact Order, And Most Of His Remaining Constitutional And Statutorv Claims
Are Implicit In The lssues He Raised Before The District Court
In Mr. Cobler's prose motion to the district court seeking to modify the no contact

I

order summarily entered against him at his arraignment, Mr. Cobler raised various
issues that put the district court on notice of the claims he is currently raising on appeal.
Because some of Mr. Cobler's claims are implicit in his motion, these issues are
properly before this Court. Therefore, the State's assertion that all of Mr. Cobler's

1
I

constitutional and statutory claims are not justiciable on appeal is without merit.

4.

Mr. Cobler's Assertion Of His Fundamental Constitutional Riclhts As A
Parent Is Clearly Preserved In His Motion To Modify The No-Contact
Order, Mr. Cobler Has Previously Established His Standing To Raise This
lssue As A Parent, And The State Has Made No Record Establishincl That
Mr. Cobler Lacks Standing As A Parent To Raise This lssue

As an initial matter, there is no dispute in this case that Mr. Cobler is the father of
three minor children. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.15.) As
such, he has established standing to assert his claim of a violation of his fundamental
rights as a parent. There is also no dispute that the no contact order entered against
Mr. Cobler preventing contact with "all minors" operates as a legal bar to his having any
contact with his three children, directly or through third parties, and that Mr. Cobler is
under threat of criminal sanction should he violate this order. I.C. 3 18-920. (R., p.7.)
Finally, a review of Mr. Cobler's motion to modify the no contact order entered against
him reveals that his central and express purpose in seeking modification is to remedy
the legal barrier that this order places between Mr. Cobler and his children. (Motion to
Modify Protection Order, pp.1-3.)
ldaho Appellate Rule 35 requires that arguments contained within the
Respondent's Brief be supported by "citations to the authorities, statutes and pads of
the transcript or record relied upon." I.A.R. 35(b)(6). Courts will not review an issue
presented by a party that fails to comply with the requirements of I.A.R. 35. See, e.g.,
Stafe

V.

Young, 144 ldaho 646, 649, n.1, 167 P.3d 783, 786 (Ct. App. 2006); c f

Weaver v. Searle Bros., 129 ldaho 497, 502-503, 927 P.2d 887, 892-893 (1996)
(declining to address issue where respondent did not make pertinent evidence part of
the record on appeal). This Court is restricted to the record before it on appeal and
"may not consider matters outside of the record." Sfafe v. Flinf, 114 ldaho 806, 809,

761 P.2d 1158, 1161 (1988) (quoting Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421, 428, 745 P.2d
300, 307 (Ct. App. 1987)).
The State alleges in its Respondent's Brief that, based on the personal
knowledge of opposing counsel, Mr. Cobler's parental rights have been terminated and
that he therefore lacks standing to pursue his assertion that his fundamental rights as a
parent have been violated.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) The State makes this

assertion without any citation to the record in this case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.)
Further, the State has not even attempted to create a record upon which to
sustain its allegations that Mr. Cobler lacks standing. Rather than seeking to augment
into the record the proceedings during which the State claims that Mr. Cobler's rights
have been terminated, opposing counsel merely relates that he had conversations with
unidentified persons during which he was allegedly informed that Mr. Cobler's rights had
been terminated. (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) While the State does provide a very
lengthy citation to a website URL in a footnote, when one actually attempts to access
this web address, all that is displayed is a mostly blank screen that reads "Case Sealed
By Court Rule or Judicial Order." (See print out of web page attached as an appendix
to this brief; Respondent's Brief, p.7, n.2.) Neither the State's reiteration of hearsay
provided from an unnamed source nor the blank screen indicating an unidentified case
that has been sealed creates a record sufficient for appellate review of the State's claim
that Mr. Cobler's parental rights have been terminated.
Moreover, even assuming that there exists a termination order, the State does
not address which (if any) of

Mr. Cobler's three children this order applies to.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6; PSI, p.15.)

This Court should note that there is no

indication whether this purported order applies to one of Mr. Cobler's three children,
Aeriel Cobler, who currently resides in Missouri and has no apparent personal
connection to the State of ldaho. (PSI, p.15.) The fact that this Court is left to speculate
as to which, if any, of Mr. Cobler's children may be affected by this order makes clear
exactly why the State's allegations are not appropriate for this Court's consideration because there is nothing more than incomplete double hearsay for this Court to rely on.
Because the State has created no record regarding whether Mr. Cobler's parental rights
have been terminated, nor which of his three children this alleged termination may have
affected, there is no basis for this Court to conclude that Mr. Cobler lacks standing to
present his claims of a violation of his fundamental rights as a parent.
In addition to failing to create a record that demonstrates Mr. Cobler's parental
rights have been terminated, the State also presents no argument or legal authority that
would explain the ultimate effect of any potential termination action that was
consummated by the State on the issues in this case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.)
This Court will not consider on appeal any assertions that are not supported by authority
or argument. State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259,263, 923 P.2d 966,970 (1996); I.A.R. 35.
It is undisputed from the record that Mr. Cobler is the father of three children who
are affected by the no contact order at issue in this case. (PSI, p.15.) Because this
order interferes with Mr. Cobler's ability to maintain any contact with his children or
otherwise exercise his fundamental rights as a parent in any meaningful way, this order
violates Mr. Cobler's fundamental rights as a parent. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.21-16.)
Mr. Cobler brought this violation directly to the district court's attention in his motion to
modify the no contact order. The State has created no record upon which this Court

can rely to refute Mr. Cobler's standing as a parent to raise his claim of a violation of his
fundamental rights as a parent. Therefore, the State's attempt to assert that this claim
is not justiciable by this Court is unavailing.
2.

Under A Liberal Reading Of Mr. Cobler's Motion To Modify The No
Contact Order, He Has Raised Facts Sufficient To Put The District Court
On Notice Of The Substance Of Many Of His Other Assertions Of Error
On Appeal

Generally, pro se defendants are held to the same standards and rules as
defendants acting with the benefit of counsel. State v. Sima, 98 ldaho 643, 644, 570
P.2d 1333, 1334 (1977). As such, status as a pro se petitioner does not excuse a
defendant from failing to comply with applicable rules on appeal. Id. However, in
contexts where pro se petitioners are often required to request relief from the district
court on their own initiative, there is generally a relaxed standard applied with regard to
the preservation of issues. For example, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus "are
liberally construed and that construction is particularly applicable in a case where the
petition was prepared by a prisoner unlearned in the law and without the aid of counsel."
Goff v. State, 91 ldaho 36, 37,415 P.2d 679;680 (1966) (emphasis added).
In cases involving a pro se defendant, it is the essential facts establishing the
claim that control, rather than the formal classification of the right asserted.
Hauschulz v. State, 143 ldaho 462, 467, 147 P.3d 94, 99 (Ct. App. 2006). As noted by
the court in Hauschulz:
The mere classification of a right is not essential. First, we recognize the
claimed right and, after such recognition, it is entitled to enforcement,
whether the name given it accords exactly with the general understanding
thereof.
Id. (quoting Fidelity Trust Co. v. State, 72 ldaho 137, 146, 237 P.2d 1058, 1064 (1951)).

Additionally, this Court has previously recognized the difficulty of a pro se
defendant in precisely articulating his claims, and reached the merits of the issues
raised on appeal by considering the substance of the pro se defendant's assertions.
State v. McCabe, I 0 1 Idaho 727, 728, 620 P.2d 300, 301 (1980) (reformulating and
discussing defendant's contentions on appeal despite the fact that these issues were
"not completely articulated.")
Mr. Cobler was not assisted by counsel in his filing of the motion to modify the no
contact order entered against him. (Motion to Modify Protection Order, pp.1-3.) It
appears that Mr. Cobler actively sought the assistance of his trial counsel in seeking to
modify the no contact order, but his efforts at obtaining legal assistance were
unavailing. (Motion to Modify Protection Order, p.2.) However, under a liberal reading
of his motion to modify the no contact order, he argued the essential facts of many of
his claims on appeal.
Mr. Cobler brought to the district court's attention that, "as the no contact order
stands," it "will expire upon dismissal of [his] case." (Motion to Modify Protection Order,
p.2.) He also pointed out that only the district court could modify this provision of his no
contact order.

(Motion to Modify Protection Order, p.2.)

Mr. Cobler's purpose in

bringing these facts to the district court's attention was to point out one of the issues
that was raised in Mr. Cobler's Appellant's Brief: that the no contact order contains no
discernible date of expiration because Mr. Cobler's case was never dismissed.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.26-28.) As such, Mr. Cobler raised the substance of his claim on
appeal that the no contact order was invalid because it failed to contain a definite date

of expiration, and therefore applied against him perpetually unless modified by the
district court.
Mr. Cobler also argued some of the essential facts underpinning his assertions of
vagueness and overbreadth in his motion. In particular, Mr. Cobler has pointed out that
his underlying offense didn't involve his own children, which are covered under the no
contact order. (Motion to Modify Protection Order, p.2.) He also pointed out that the
charges levied against him were relating to someone who was far older than his
children (a girl a few months shy of her 18'~birthday). (Motion to Modify Protection
Order, p.2; R., pp.8-10.) This raises the question of the potential unconstitutional scope
of the order, and of the statute upon which the order was purportedly entered, based on
the fact that there was no relationship between the underlying offense and those
included in the group covered by the no contact order entered against him. (See also,
Appellant's Brief, p.9.)
Moreover, as previously noted, Mr. Cobler has clearly asserted his fundamental
rights as a parent in his motion to modify the no contact order. See Point I(B)(l) supra.
Certain of his fundamental rights as a parent are coextensive with his First Amendment
rights of speech and intimate association that are implicated in Mr. Cobler's vagueness
and overbreadth challenges.

Familial relationships, such as the parent-child

relationship, are a classic example of the type of intimate associations that receive
heightened First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 617-620 (1984). This Court should note that "intimate association" is a legal term
of art that refers to the First Amendment right to associate with others in individualized
relationships and affiliations, but does not refer to "intimacy" in the common sense of the

term that would otherwise connote any form of romantic or sexual involvement. Id.
Because Mr. Cobler's assertion of a violation of his fundamental rights as a parent
encompasses an assertion of a violation of his First Amendment rights to intimate
association with his family members, Mr. Cobler's vagueness and overbreadth claims
are implicit in his assertion of his rights as a parent
C.

Assuming. Arauendo. That Some Of Mr. Cobler's Constitutional And Statutory
Chailenqes Are Raised For The First Time On Appeal. Thev Are Likelv To Recur
U ~ o Remand
n
And Therefore This Court Mav Properlv Consider Them
As previously noted, Mr. Cobler asserts that some of his constitutional and

statutory challenges on appeal were implicit in the claims raised when he moved the
district court to modify the no contact order it entered against him. However, even if
some of these issues were not properly raised below, Mr. Cobler asserts that these
issues are justiciable before this Court because they are likely to recur upon remand of
his case.
Generally, questions of law, such as challenges to the constitutionality or
construction of a statute, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

See, e.g.,

Sanchez v. Arave, 120 ldaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991). However, an
exception to this rule applies where the appellant presents questions of law which may
arise in further proceedings as a result of the disposition of the appeal. Messmer v. Ker,
96 Idaho 75, 78, 524 P.2d 536, 539 (1974).
Here, there is at least one ground that was unquestionably preserved for this
Court's review and which invalidates the district court's no contact order in this case:
the district court's entry of a no contact order that is in violation of Mr. Cobler's
fundamental rights as a parent and that was entered without meeting the constitutional

requirements of due process. (See Point I(B)(l) supra, Appellant's Brief, pp.21-26.)
Moreover, Mr. Cobler has raised, and the district court has reached, the substance of
the issue regarding the lack of any discernible date of termination for the no contact
order at issue in this case. (See Point I(E) infra; Motion to Modify Protection Order, p.2.;
Appellant's Brief, pp.26-28.) Assuming that this Court does not find that the additional
questions of law regarding the no contact order have been adequately raised before the
district court, this Court should nonetheless deem these issues justiciable, because they
are likely to recur upon remand should the district court attempt to modify and re-enter
the no contact order in this case.

D.

Mr. Cobler's Statutory And Constitutional Issues Are Justiciable Bv This Court
Because Thev Are Assertions Of Fundamental Errors That Affect Mr. Cobler's
Most Basic And Fundamental Rights
Certain errors, known as fundamental errors, are reviewable on appeal

regardless of whether these errors were actually raised before the district court. See,
e.g., Sfafe v. Bingham, 116 ldaho 415, 423, 776 P.2d 424, 432 (1989). "Error that is
fundamental must be such error as goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's
rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right which
was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive.
Each case will of necessity, under such a rule, stand on its own merits." Id. (quoting
Sfafe v. Garcia, 128 P.2d 459,462 (N.M. 1942).
A direct violation of an important constitutional right may constitute a fundamental
error that is reviewable by this Court for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v.
Kenner, 123 ldaho 594, 597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1992) (finding that allegation that
district court violated constitutional right against self-incrimination is allegation of a

fundamental error); Sfafe v. Yakovic, 145 ldaho 437, 442, 180 P.3d 476, 481 (2008)
(fundamental error not shown when alleged error did not violate a fundamental right);
Sfate v. Chrisfiansen, 144 ldaho 463, 470, 163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007) (alleged
violation based on defendant's exercise of Fourth Amendment rights is fundamental
error); Stafe

V.

Timmons, 145 ldaho 279, 291, 178 P.3d 644, 656 (Ct. App. 2007);

Minfun v. State, 144 ldaho 656, 661, 168 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. App. 2007) (presuming for
purposes of appeal that violation of Confrontation Clause is allegation of fundamental
error).
There can be no question as to the fundamental nature of the rights being
asserted by Mr. Cobler that were violated by the no contact order entered by the district
court. It is well established that the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and of
association, as guaranteed by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, are among
the most fundamental, indispensable, and important of all individual rights. See, e.g.,
Gentile

V.

State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1039 (1991); NAACP v. Alabama, 357

U.S. 449, 460-461 (1958); West Virginia Stafe Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 US. 624,
638 (1943); c.f Johnson v. Sunshine Mine Co., Inc., 106 ldaho 866, 869, 684 P.2d 268,
271 (1984) (recognizing freedom of speech as a fundamental right); HoNoway v.
Palmer, 105 ldaho 220, 227, 668 P.2d 96, 103 (1983) (recognizing First Amendment
freedom of association as a fundamental right).
Likewise, it is equally well-established that parents have a basic, fundamental
right to involvement, decision making, and associational rights with regard to their
children's lives. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925); State v. Doe, 144 ldaho 534, 536, 164 P.3d

814, 816 (2007). This Court should note that the Court in Doe has already held that an
alleged violation of one's fundamental rights as a parent constitutes an allegation of a
fundamental error that is reviewable for the first time on appeal. Doe, 144 Idaho at 535536, 164 P.3d at 815-816. Each of these fundamental rights are at the core of the
constitutional violations asserted by Mr. Cobler in his motion to modify the no contact
order and on appeal. See Point 1(B) supra; Appellant's Brief generally.
Additionally, the related issues of whether a no contact order may be entered
pursuant to 1.C $j 18-920 against an entire class of persons and whether these orders
may persist "until dismissal" in absence of any concrete date of termination are
essential to the determination of whether the no contact order in this case and the
statute authorizing such orders are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. If this
Court determines that I.C. $j 18-920 permits the entry of a no contact order against
entire classes of persons, as opposed to against a named and identifiable individual,
then the statutory problems of vagueness and overbreadth will multiply exponentially
with the number of members of the class of persons in whose favor the no contact order
is entered. See Appellant's Brief, pp.6-21, 28-29. Likewise, if the no contact order can
rightfully be entered against a person indefinitely, as would be the result where the
district court enters a no contact order to expire "upon dismissal" of the case when no
dismissal occurs, then the constitutional problems of vagueness and overbreadth would
accumulate over the lifetime of the person subject to the order. (See Appellant's Brief,
pp.6-21, 26-28.) Mr. Cobler's assertions of error regarding the entry of a no contact
order against a class of persons rather than a named individual and regarding the lack
of a discernible date of expiration are inextricably intertwined with his assertions of

violations of his fundamental rights to speech and association. As such, all issues
raised by Mr. Cobler regarding the no contact order entered against him are properly
reviewable by this Court as fundamental errors.
E.

The District Court in This Case Reached The lssue Of A Lack Of A Discernible
Date Of Termination Of Its Own Initiative When It Relied On This Lack Of An
Expiration Date In Denvins Mr. Cobler's Motion To Modifv The No Contact Order:
And Therefore This Court May Properly Review This lssue
As has been noted, most issues generally cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal. State v. DuValf, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998). "An exception
to this rule, however, has been applied by this Court when the issue was argued to or
decided by the frial court." Id. (emphasis added.) When an issue has been decided by
the district court below, this Court will decide the issue on appeal. Id.
Of its own initiative, the district court in this case made a determination regarding
the fact that the no contact order failed to contain any discernible date of expiration, and
relied on this determination when it denied Mr. Cobler's request to modify the no contact
order. The district court relied on the fact that there was no discernible expiration date
for the no contact order at issue in this case when it denied Mr. Cobler's motion to
modify the no contact order. (Second Memorandum Decision Re Defendant's Motion
) that order, the district
For Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, ~ u ~ m e n t . 'In
court addresses Mr. Cobler's motion to modify the no contact order and states that,
"That order was to remain in effect until dismissal of the case." (Second Memorandum

The district court's Second Memorandum Decision Re Defendant's Motion For
Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 was augmented into the record through a
motion to augment filed by Mr. Cobler that this Court granted on May 2, 2008.

Decision Re Defendant's Motion For Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35,
Augment.) with no further analysis, the district court proceeded to deny any request to
modify Mr. Cobler's sentence, including his request to modify the no contact order.
(Second Memorandum Decision Re Defendant's Motion For Reduction of Sentence
Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, Augment.)
Because the district court affirmatively reached the issue of a lack of a
discernible expiration date in its denial of Mr. Cobler's motion to modify the no contact
order, this issue is properly before this Court.

The State's Failure To Assert Anv Compellincr State Interest, Or Assert Any Basis Upon
Which To Conclude That I.C. 5 18-920 Is Narrowlv Tailored To That Unidentified
Interest, Is Fatal To An Attempt On The Part Of The State To Meet Its Burden Under
Strict Scrutinv Review, Which Is The Applicable Standard Of Review For Mr. Cobler's
Assertions Of Vaqueness And Overbreadth In This Case
A.

Introduction
In its Respondent's Brief, the State failed to address the substance of any of

Mr. Cobler's claims regarding the no contact order that was entered against him in this
case, and instead relied exclusively on argument that Mr. Cobler's issues with regard to
this order were not preserved for appeal.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.4-6.) As noted

above, Mr. Cobler's issues are, in fact, properly justiciable by this Court.
Among the issues presented in Mr. Cobler's Appellant's Brief are claims that the
no contact order entered against him, and the statute authorizing such orders, are
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-21.) As is discussed
more fully below, strict scrutiny review applies to Mr. Cobler's First Amendment claims

in this case. Under strict scrutiny review, the burden of proof shifts to the State upon a
prima facie showing of unconstitutionality. The State then has the burden of both
production and persuasion to establish that the challenged statute serves a compelling
state interest and that the statute is narrowly tailored to that interest.
Here, Mr. Cobler, in his Appellant's Brief, established a prima facie showing that
I.C.

3

18-920 was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, both on its face and as

applied.' The State has made no attempt to identify any state interest that is served by
the statute authorizing entry of criminal no contact orders, nor has the State addressed
how I.C. 3 18-920 is narrowly tailored to that unidentified interest. Because the burden
of proof has shifted affirmatively to the State to make these showings, the State has
failed to meet its burden to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality of I.C. 3 18920.

'As a component of Mr. Cobler's assertion that I.C. 3 18-920 is unconstitutionally vague
on its face and as applied to his case, he has asked this Court to revisit the appropriate
showing required in order to establish facial vagueness in the context of criminal
statutes. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-16.) Mr. Cobler wishes to make a clarification
regarding one of the cases that he has asked this Court to re-examine. As noted in his
Appellant's Brief, State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d 126, 132 (2003) relies
primarily on the case of Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) as
authority for requiring a showing of vagueness in all applications in order to establish
facial vagueness, even in the context of criminal statutes. (Appellant's Brief, p.14.)
Mr. Cobler wishes to clarify that, in addition to Hoffman Estates, the Court in Korsen
relied upon United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). However, just as in
Hoffman Estates, in Salerno the United States Supreme Court addressed a regulatory
statute, not a statute which imposes criminal punishment. Salemo, 481 U.S. at 746.
Thus, application of the standards articulated in Salerno is inappropriate when the
statute at issue authorizes criminal penalties, i.e. punishment. (Appellant's Brief, pp.1316.)

B.

Strict Scrutinv Is The Appropriate Standard For Review In This Case; And The
State's Failure To Assert Any Compellina State Interest, Or Assert Anv Basis
Upon Which To Conclude That I.C. yj 18-920 Is Narrowly Tailored To That
Unidentified Interest. Is Fatal To An Attempt On The Part Of The State To Meet
Its Burden Under This Standard Of Review
The statute at issue in this case, I.C.

3

18-920, criminalizes two forms of

constitutionally protected activity: the First Amendment freedom of speech and
communication, and the First Amendment freedom of intimate association. As applied
to Mr. Cobler's case, this statute imposed a prior restraint on speech and on any
individual associational activity (intimate association) with any person under the age of
18, including his own children.
As noted in Mr. Cobler's Appellant's Brief, the no contact order entered against
him operates as an injunction that constitutes a prior restraint on speech. (Appellant's
Brief, p.8.) "The term prior restraint is used 'to describe administrative and judicial
orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such
communications are to occur.' Temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions

- i.e. court orders that actually forbid speech activities - are classic examples of prior
restraints." Alexander v. U.S., 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (quoting M. Nimmer, Nimmer
on Freedom of Speech 3 4.03, p.4-14 (1984)) (internal citations omitted). Because the
no contact order entered against Mr. Cobler is a judicial order forbidding all
communications with minors, directly or indirectly, that was issued prospectively (prior to
such communication occurring), this no contact order is a prior restraint on speech. See
also In re Marriage of Suggs, 93 P.3d 161, 164 (Wash. 2004); State v. Hague, 547
N.W.2d 173, 176 (S.D. 1996). "Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to

this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
The no contact order at issue in this case also constitutes an injunction against

Mr. Cobler engaging in his First Amendment right of association with those who are
under the age of 18, including his own children. In determining the degree of scrutiny
that applies to an alleged infringement of associational freedoms, this Court considers
such attributes as relative smallness, the degree of selectivity in associational contacts,
and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the association, among other
considerations. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. In this case, the unconstitutionalviolations of
both of these First Amendment freedoms are subject to strict scrutiny review. See, e.g.,
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-620 (discussing how familial and selective individual
relationships merit highest protection);NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-439 (1963);
New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (strict scrutiny review applies to
prior restraints on speech); Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765766 (1994) (injunctions imposing a prior restraint on speech must burden no more
speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest); Suggs, 93 P.3d at
83 (anti-harassment protection order is prior restraint on speech and therefore "must be
couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted
by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order").
It is a firmly established and basic tenet of strict scrutiny analysis that, once an
individual challenging a statute has established a constitutional violation to which strict
scrutiny applies, the burden of proof shiffs to the State to establish that the statute
furthers a compelling State interest, and that the challenged statute is necessary to

further that interest (i.e. there are no less restrictive alternatives available).

See

Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 136 ldaho 560, 569, 38 P.3d 598, 607 (2001); Bradbury v. ldaho
Judicial Council, 136 ldaho 63, 69, 28 P.3d 1006, 1012 (2001); Simpson v. Cenarrusa,
130 ldaho 609, 615, 944 P.2d 1372, 1378 (1997) (Silak, J., concurring); Button, 371
U.S. at 439; Corning v. Board of Elections of Albany County, 440 N.E.2d 1326, 1328
(NY 1982) (strict scrutiny test places the burden on the State itself to demonstrate both
that a compelling State interest is served by the classification and that the classification
constitutes the least drastic means available to satisfy that interest).
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, "the presumption in favor of constitutionality is
not applicable'' and the State "must show a compelling interest to vindicate the law."
Bradburry, 136 ldaho at 69, 38 P.3d at 1012. The shifting of the burden of proof to the
State includes the burden of production.

See Virginia DepY of State Police v.

Washington Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4IthCir. 2004) (articulating strict scrutiny standard
in the context of an alleged violation of First Amendment right of access to public
documents); BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
209 (8thed. 2004) (defining the scope of burden
of proof to encompass "both the burden ofpersuasion and the burden of production).).
In meeting its burden of production, the State must present specific reasons in
support of its position. Virginia Dep't of State Police, 386 F.3d at 575. This includes a
requirement, not only that the State identify what compelling interest is being served by
the challenged legislation or action, but further requires the State identify reasons why
this compelling state interest is implicated in that particular case. Id.at 579. The failure
on the part of the State to present any evidence or argument supporting the existence of

a compelling state interest is fatal to its attempt to establish the validity of a statute or
regulation. Id. at 580.
Here, Mr. Cobler has established in his Appellant's Brief a showing that I.C. 5 18920, both on its face and as applied to the facts and circumstances of his case, is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in its restriction of First Amendment freedoms.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-21.) As a result, the burden of proof shifted to the State to
establish a compelling state interest served by I.C.

3

18-920, and to further establish

how the statute is narrowly tailored to that interest. Rudeen, 136 ldaho at 569, 38 P.3d
at 607; Bradbury, 136 ldaho at 69, 28 P.3d at 3012; Button, 371 U.S.at 439. The State
has made no attempt to meet this burden. Where the State has completely failed to
allege any interest in support of the challenged legislation in the face of a prima facie
case supporting the finding of unconstitutionality, the presumption of unconstitutionality
must prevail. C.f. Smith v. ldaho Com'n on Redistricting, 136 ldaho 542, 545, 38 P.3d
121, 124 (2001) (finding that redistricting action was unconstitutional where individual
challenging redistricting had established prima facie case of discrimination and "the
State has not presented any evidence that the reason@) for the population disparity
result from advancement of a rational state policy.").

CONCLUSION
Mr. Cobler respectfully requests that this Court vacate the no contact order
entered against him. Mr. Cobler further respectfully requests that this Court reduce his
sentence as it deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his
Rule 35 motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.
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